熵指数的可分解特性及其在多元化测度中的应用

熵是对不确定性的度量,被广泛应用于多个学科领域。可分解特性是熵统计量的良好品质,它使事件的总体熵可以分解为类间熵和平均的类内熵。这种特性应用到公司多元化水平的测度中,可以有效地解决多元化指数在统计分析中的多重共线性问题。     

Conditional ordering extensions

We produce a solution to the problem of extending a quasiordering conditional on a finite list of ex-ante comparisons between pairs. This constitutes yet another extension of the classical Szpilrajn’s theorem. Some examples of use of our result follow.     

Information Disclosure as Environmental Regulation: A Theoretical Analysis

Governments around the world are beginning to embrace a new form of environmental regulation – mandatory disclosure of information. While information disclosure programs appear to have an impact on subsequent firm behavior – often resulting in lower levels of pollution – little is known about the costs and benefits of these programs and whether or not they enhance social welfare. This paper presents a simple bargaining model where mandatory information disclosure is used to overcome a lack of information on the part of the public. We characterize the conditions under which information disclosure will lead to a reduction in emissions, and ultimately, the conditions under which it will enhance social welfare. Several extensions of the model are briefly explored, including the effect of two sources of pollution – only one of which is subject to information disclosure. This paper was prepared while V. Santhakumar was a Visiting Scholar at the Vanderbilt Center for Environmental Management Studies, Vanderbilt University.     

论传统外部性理论解决环境代际外部性的失效

代际外部性问题主要是人类代际之间行为的相互影响,尤其是前代对后代、当代对后代的影响。在解决代际外部性上,施害者、受害者和政府生活在不同的时空中,新古典方法几乎就无能为力。产权的界定是在产权主体存在的前提下进行的,所以产权在代际进行界定是不可能实现的,所以通过科斯定理来消除代际的外部性也行不通。     

Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities

I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal-form games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is a nonempty, complete lattice—in particular, subgame-perfect Nash equilibria exist. For this purpose I introduce a device that allows the study of the set of subgame-perfect equilibria as the set of fixed points of a correspondence. My results are limited because extensive-form games of strategic complementarities turn out—surprisingly—to be a very restrictive class of games.     

新制度经济学的产权界定理论述评

发现产权界定在资源配置和市场交易中的重要作用是科斯对新制度经济学发展的一个巨大贡献。在科斯之后,德姆塞茨揭示了产权界定的形式及其发生的机理,波斯纳给出了产权界定应遵循的一般性准则,巴泽尔揭示了产权界定的相对性和公共领域,诺思则对国家界定产权的目的、优势和存在的问题等作了进一步的研究。     

A NOTE ON ARBITRAGE AND CLOSED CONVEX CONES

We give an example of a subspace K of     such that     , where     denotes the closure with respect to convergence in probablity. On the other hand, the cone   C ≔ K − L ^∞₊  is dense in   L ^∞  with respect to the weak-star topology  σ( L ^∞, L ¹)  . This example answers a question raised by I. Evstigneev. The topic is motivated by the relation of the notion of no arbitrage and the existence of martingale measures in Mathematical Finance.     

Winners, Losers, and the Nuclear-Waste Dilemma

This paper explores how property-right assignment affects social efficiency when a public program has both “public good” and “public bad” components. We show that when willingness to accept a public bad exceeds the willingness to pay, the net benefit is unambiguously lower when the property right supports the status quo institutional structure. Thus, Kaldor–Hicks efficiency tests tend to favor public programs and mitigation over the status quo even when mitigation negatively affects another group. To illustrate the result, we develop social-cost estimates for moving nuclear waste from current temporary-storage facilities to a permanent central repository at Yucca Mountain, NV, USA. For a representative city with a population of 226,195, the present value of the external cost of shipping waste is $1.42 billion when those living near temporary nuclear-waste storage facilities are assigned the property right to “health and safety.” That number swells to $5.95 billion when those living near the transport route are assigned the property right. Thus, property-right assignment affects the efficient level of nuclear-waste, and thus nuclear energy, produced.